For those who follow South Caucasus geopolitics closely, Pakistan is not a “new player in the game.”" Islamabad has always closely supported Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and is the only country in the world yet to recognize Armenia as a sovereign state.

Recently, Azerbaijan–Pakistan ties have grown significantly through economic and military-technical cooperation. Pakistan threw its full support behind Azerbaijan during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, supplying weapons and providing training for Azerbaijani special forces. When Azerbaijan claimed victory in November 2020, the streets of Baku were full of Pakistani flags.

Relations grew closer still after 2020, with intensive negotiations to buy Pakistani-made military jets and supply Azerbaijani gas to Pakistan.

On July 11, 2024, President Aliyev of Azerbaijan visited Pakistan as a sign of growing bilateral relations. The two countries signed agreements and memoranda of understanding in trade, commerce, telecommunications, and mineral resources.

They discussed a series of joint projects worth $2 billion, setting up a bilateral committee to develop the projects. Most importantly, President Aliyev expressed his full support for Pakistan on the issue of Kashmir, claiming that international law and justice are on the side of Pakistan.

Official dinner hosted by Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif in honor of Ilham Aliyev. Photo: https://president.az

What are the main drivers of this love affair? After the military takeover of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic in September 2023 and the forced displacement of 105000 Armenians who lived there, Azerbaijan emerged emboldened, believing itself to be on the path of becoming a regional hegemon in the South Caucasus.

To further advance that ambition and become a middle power on the global stage, Azerbaijan feels the need to increase its involvement in issues that go beyond the South Caucasus.

In this context, Azerbaijan has been investing in its ties with other Turkic and Muslim countries, such as Turkey and Central Asian states. In recent years, the number of visits by Turkish and Central Asian officials to Azerbaijan and vice versa has grown exponentially.

Azerbaijan aims to add a geo-economic layer to this policy. Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Kazakhstan are pushing forward the idea of establishing the Middle Corridor, to connect China with Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and Turkey.

Azerbaijan established a strategic partnership with China a few days ago, another step in this strategy. The development of relations with Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country, is entirely in line with the Azerbaijani strategy. It will strengthen the Turkic and Muslim direction of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy and serve as another example of the growing significance of Azerbaijan in broader Eurasia.

Another possible explanation for Azerbaijan’s efforts to enhance cooperation with Pakistan may be Baku’s interest in gaining an insight into Pakistan’s tactics in hybrid and conventional warfare, particularly those applicable to operations in mountainous regions.

Azerbaijan may also use a vast array of non-state actors from Pakistan during its future attacks against Armenia. As Azerbaijan continues to undermine peace negotiations with Armenia and resist US pressure to sign an agreement with Yerevan, Baku is making clear preparations on the ground for a new phase of its confrontation with Armenia.

After taking Nagorno-Karabakh by force, Azerbaijan has focused its rhetoric and claims on the Syunik region of southern Armenia, bordering Iran. Syunik is a strip of land that separates Azerbaijan from Turkey and, in President Aliyev’s words, divides the Turkic world, which runs from Istanbul to the Kazakhstan–China border.

As Syunik is within Armenia’s internationally recognized borders, Azerbaijan will face international backlash if it pursues a plan to occupy and annex the Syunik region. But a policy of slow encroachment is already underway, with a standing incursion of Azerbaijani troops in pockets of Armenian territory.

A further impulse behind Baku’s policy of deepening cooperation with Pakistan appears to be Azerbaijan’s desire to strategically provoke India. This approach seems to be aimed at countering India’s growing influence in the region and clearly signals Azerbaijan’s capacity to align with India’s regional adversaries.

Azerbaijan is concerned by growing Armenia–India military-technical cooperation and has repeatedly expressed its resentment, accusing Delhi of triggering a revanchist mood in Armenia. By publicly criticizing India and supporting Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, Azerbaijan wants to send a signal to India that Baku can create problems for Delhi.

With Pakistan facing significant financial challenges and on the brink of economic collapse, Islamabad is interested in attracting Azerbaijani investment in the Pakistani economy and earning much-needed hard currency by selling weapons to Baku.

By supporting Muslim Azerbaijan, Pakistan would like to increase its influence and gain respect among other Muslim countries. As in the case of Azerbaijan, the desire to irritate India is a significant driver in Pakistan’s decision to support its partners in Baku. As India increases its involvement in the South Caucasus, Pakistan is signaling to Delhi that it can counter India in the region.

The growing strategic partnership of Azerbaijan and Pakistan is becoming a significant factor in regional geopolitics in several ways.

Military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Pakistan, including arms sales and military training, has the potential to enhance Azerbaijan’s military capabilities and readiness, particularly in the sphere of its ongoing aggression toward Armenia.

The partnership also strengthens the strategic alliances between Turkic and Muslim countries, aligning Azerbaijan more closely with Pakistan, Turkey, and Central Asian states. This alliance fosters a united bloc that can influence regional geopolitics and economic initiatives.

Azerbaijan’s interest in Pakistan’s experience with hybrid and conventional warfare and gray-zone operations introduces new regional security dynamics. This expertise can be leveraged to enhance Azerbaijan’s strategic operations capacities and capabilities against Armenia.

Armenia and India should carefully follow these developments, as Yerevan and Delhi are the main foreign targets of this cooperation.

As Azerbaijan prepares for the “battle of Syunik” and is getting ready to use elements from Pakistan’s playbook to enhance its power, Armenia should build its capacity to counter hybrid and conventional warfare and gray-zone operations, leveraging India’s experience and expertise.

This also enables Delhi to develop a firmer presence in the South Caucasus. Armenia–India cooperation in this field has great potential to benefit both countries, as Yerevan and Delhi seek to increase their collaboration and counter mutual threats.

[The writer is a Senior Research Fellow at Applied Policy Research Institute of Armenia (APRI Armenia). The opinion expressed in the article is of the writer.]